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Abstract  
Climate change impacts pose a great challenge to agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa as droughts 
become more frequent and more severe. A major roadblock to implementing climate change 
adaptation measures is poor governance. Given their experience with governing organizations, 
farmers are highly suitable respondents to assess the appropriateness of different governing 
organizations to implement adaptation measures on the ground. We surveyed 300 farmers in 
Makueni County in Kenya applying the choice experiment method to assess their preferences in 
relation to different attributes of a sand storage dam project to enhance rainwater harvesting as an 
adaptation measure. Attributes include the organization governing the dam construction, dam wall 
height and volume of water harvested, the type of pump used to distribute water, number of tree 
rows planted to prevent silting, and labor time farmers are willing to contribute to dam 
construction. Responses were analyzed using the mixed logit model. Our key result shows that 
farmers prefer an NGO as the governing organization, followed closely by a farmer network and, 
with some distance, a government institution. For the whole of Makueni County, we find that 
benefit losses of $ 482,766 occur if farmer networks are the governing organizations instead of 
NGOs and $ 2,679,706 if government institutions govern the dam construction instead of NGOs. 
While the importance of governance structures for development is well-known, our study is novel 
as it quantifies the benefit losses that occur due to poor governance in the field of climate change 
adaptation. On a methodological level, our study contributes to improving the application of choice 
experiments in developing countries as it draws attention to the careful selection of the payment 
vehicle. In terms of policy recommendations, our results suggest that substantial benefit losses 
may occur if appropriate governing organizations are not selected when implementing much 
needed climate adaptation measures. 
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1. Introduction  
Climate change poses a major threat to agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa. Over the past 50 years, 
climate change-induced drought frequency and intensity have increased (Detges, 2017), 
exacerbating water scarcity problems affecting both surface and groundwater resources (Mishra 
and Singh, 2011). Further, rising temperatures have disrupted crop productivity and affected water 
availability at the important stages of crop growth (Zamasiya et al., 2017). The vegetation cover 
has increasingly died off, reducing species richness and plant cover across the region (Epule et al., 
2017). Consequently, it is estimated that about half of the 1.033 billion people in sub-Saharan 
Africa are facing food insecurity associated with global climate change (Epule et al., 2017). 
Climate change adaptation is one of the policy options supported by the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to help developing countries reduce the 
negative impacts of climate change on the agricultural sector (Deressa et al., 2009; UNFCC report, 
2015). Climate change adaptation measures can be classified as either private or public (IPCC 
TAR, 2001; Milman and Warner, 2016). Private adaptation measures are those implemented by 
individual farmers or small groups of farmers to address adaptation needs that are specific to them 
(Milman and Warner, 2016). They include: small scale irrigation of crops when rain fails, crop 
and livestock diversification, use of soil and water conservation techniques and changes in planting 
dates, among others (Francisco et al., 2009; Bryan et al., 2010). Public adaptation measures are 
actions on a larger scale that are implemented by government institutions through public and 
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private partnerships or otherwise coordinated action at the local level (Milman and Warner, 2016). 
Examples of public adaptation measures include: prevention of flood and flood damage on crop 
land through construction of drainage pumping sytems and canals, construction of water resorvoirs 
(dykes and dams) for irrigation, and the development of hazard maps on floods and drought 
impacts (UNFCC, 2006; NPAICC, 2015). 
A key challenge when implementing public adaptation measures is the selection of the appropriate 
governing organization to coordinate efforts and administer the available adaptation funds, which 
may come from the government, international donors or farmer networks. In principle, it would be 
the task of local or regional governments to provide a governance structure for the implementation 
of adaptation measures. However, in developing countries in general and sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular, there is a substantial risk that funds channeled through the government may not reach 
those who need them due to leakages resulting from corruption and excessive administrative costs 
(Besley and Ghatak, 2017).  
Two main alternatives to goverment organizations have been proposed (Besley and Ghatak, 2017). 
First, NGOs as self-governing nonprofit organizations whose aim is to improve the livelihoods of 
vulnerable people in rural areas. Their general objective is to empower local communities by 
initiating people-centered projects that require local communities to participate in the design and 
implementation processes (Morgan, 2016). Second, farmer networks composed of groups of 
farmers who come together to share ideas on how they themselves can provide and/or participate 
in the provision of public goods, often also with support from governments and NGOs. Farmer 
networks are common in sub-Saharan Africa and they undertake different farm activities ranging 
from crop production and marketing of produce to community development projects (Fischer and 
Qaim, 2014).  
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Several studies have analyzed corruption and governance in relation to the implementation of 
climate change related projects in developing countries. For example, Robinson (2017) used a 
qualitative approach to understand climate change adaptation mainstreaming in small island 
developing countries. He found that bad governance, corruption and the selfishness of prominent 
leaders who have a mandate to make adaptation decisions hinder mainstreaming of adaptation. In 
a survey of empirical cases Shackleton et al. (2015) found that corruption and elite capture at the 
local level is one of the main barriers to the implementation of adaptation measures in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Pueyo (2018) analyzed the constraints of renewable energy investment in sub-Saharan 
Africa using the Growth Diagnostics framework and identified poor governance as a key constraint 
to the growth of renewable energy, especially in Kenya. Furthermore, a qualitative study by 
Binswanger-Mkhize and McCalla (2010) indicates that corruption and poor governance lead to 
loss of resources intended for agricultural and rural development projects before they reach service 
providers (Binswanger-Mkhize and McCalla, 2010).  
However, there is a lack of studies that quantitatively evaluate different governing organizations 
for adaptation measures. In principle, the economic valuation method of choice experiments (CE) 
is a suitable approach to evaluate different governing organizations from the perspective of those 
for whom adaptation measures are implemented. CE is a stated preference method used to elicit 
individual preferences and marginal values for environmental goods and services through the 
creation of hypothetical scenarios that are presented to respondents in the form of choice cards 
(Navrud and Pruckner, 1997). CE is based on Lancaster’s model of consumer behavior, in which 
consumers derive utility from the attributes of a good and not the good itself (Lancaster, 1966). 
Accordingly, respondents are asked to compare and value the provision of a specific good, based 
on different characteristics of these attributes (Hensher, 1994; Rai, 2012). In this context, a climate 
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change adaptation measure can be considered an environmental good and the organization that 
governs its provision one of its attributes. Choice experiments have been widely employed to 
evaluate environmental goods in developed countries (e.g. Kuhfuss et al., 2016; Markova-Nenova 
and Wätzold, 2017; Vaissière et al. 2018). On a much smaller scale, but increasingly, they have 
also been applied in developing countries (Birol and Das, 2010; Ndunda and Mungatana, 2013; 
Osiolo, 2017). Their increasing use in developing countries is accompanied by a debate on the 
specific challenges that arise when choice experiments are employed in such countries (Do and 
Bennet, 2009; Birol and Das, 2010; Kahn et al., 2017). 
We employed the choice experiment method to survey 300 farmers to evaluate different 
hypothetical scenarios of sand storage dam construction as an adaptation measure in Makueni 
County in Kenya. Attributes of the dam include: dam wall height and volume of water harvested, 
type of pump used to distribute water, number of Grevillea robusta tree rows planted to prevent 
silting, amount of labor time in weeks farmers are willing to contribute to dam construction and – 
most important in the context of this paper – the governing organization that administers and 
organizes the implementation of the dam project. Our key finding is that farmers prefer NGOs 
slightly over farmer networks and substantially over local governments as the governing 
organization for the implementation of adaptation measures. This finding is important in two ways. 
First, we provide highly policy-relevant information on how farmers evaluate the different 
governing organizations and quantitatively assess the benefit losses that arise if government 
institutions or, much less so, farmer networks instead of NGOs administer adaptation measures. 
This is reliable information on the performance of the three governing organizations as farmers 
have on-the-ground experience with all of them. The information is valuable for policy 
implementation as it demonstrates the importance of selecting appropriate governing organizations 
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when implementing adaptation measures and the benefit losses if inappropriate organizations are 
selected.  
Second, from a methodological point of view our results draw attention to a key aspect that needs 
to be considered when applying choice experiments in developing countries, namely the careful 
selection of the payment vehicle. Here the “payment vehicle” refers to the mechanism presented 
in the CE of how the project in question would be financed if it were implemented (Ivehammar, 
2009). The choice of payment vehicle and the potential bias that may arise and its impact on the 
willingness to pay for a good has been discussed in the context of developed countries (e.g. 
Bergstrom et al., 2004; Campos et al., 2007; Ivehammar, 2009). However, we did not find any 
studies that address in similar depth the importance of the payment vehicle in developing countries. 
Instead studies typically select a specific payment vehicle. Examples include tax increases (Birol 
and Das, 2010; Ndunda and Mungatana, 2013), increases in product prices (Roessler et al., 2008; 
Osiolo 2017), crop yield losses (Waldman et al., 2017), and donations to a nature conservation 
fund (Randrianarison and Wätzold 2017). Our results suggest that the stated willingness to pay of 
respondents in developing countries would be substantially different – and most likely this 
difference would be much larger than in developed countries – depending on whether an 
environmental project is supposed to be financed through, say, a tax paid to the government or a 
contribution to a fund administered by an NGO. 
 
2. Choice experiments  
We use CE to measure the preferences of farmers and their willingness to pay for the construction 
of a dam with multiple attributes as a climate change adaptation measure. A specific focus is the 
evaluation of the organization that governs the dam construction.  
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2.1 Econometric analysis 
In our case, farmers are supposed to choose their most preferred sand storage dam option among 
different alternatives presented to them in the choice cards. Based on the assumption that farmers 
choose by maximizing their utility, we apply the random utility model (RUM) to estimate the 
probability of choosing one dam alternative over another (Thurstone, 1927; McFadden, 1974). 
According to the RUM framework, the utility that an individual i obtains from choosing alternative 
s is 𝑈𝑖𝑠  .The utility 𝑈𝑖𝑠 can be split into two components: a deterministic component composed of 
a vector of dam characteristics 𝐾𝑖𝑠 that influence respondents’ decisions, and an error 
component 𝜀𝑖𝑠. The maximum utility that each farmer obtains from each dam alternative can be 
expressed as function: 
𝑈𝑖𝑠 =  𝛽
′𝐾𝑖𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑠                                                                                                                             (1)  
where 𝛽 represents a vector of coefficient estimates. The random error component 𝜀𝑖𝑠 represents 
unobservable effects on respondents’ choices and is expected to follow the identically and 
independently distributed (IID) Gumbel distribution (Meyerhoff et al., 2014). Using equation (1), 
the probability of individual i choosing alternative s over alternative j in a choice set is 𝑃𝑖𝑠 and can 
be represented by a multinomial logit (MNL) model (Meyerhoff et al., 2014) as follows. 
𝑃𝑖𝑠 =
𝑒𝑉𝑠𝑖
∑ e𝑉𝑗𝑖  𝐽𝑗=1
,                                                                                                                              (2) 
where 𝑉𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽
′𝐾𝑖𝑠  and J is the choice set. The 𝛽 represents the mean marginal utility for each of 
the dam attributes including the governing organizations. However, MNL has a disadvantage in 
that it assumes the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, which means the 
preferences for dam attributes and governing organizations remain the same across farmers’ 
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choices (Ghosh et al., 2013). In some case studies this assumption holds but in other studies 
preferences are different across individuals and attributes. The mixed logit (ML) model overcomes 
the limitations of the MNL model by allowing the random parameter estimates to vary across 
respondents, alternatives and choice scenarios (Bliemer and Rose, 2010; Grigolon et al., 2014). 
The ML model allows heterogeneity within the observed and unobserved attributes of the data set 
through the variation of the parameter estimates (𝛽). The main characteristic of the ML model is 
the capacity to allow random taste variation, unrestricted substitution patterns and the correlation 
of error terms (Meyerhoff et al., 2014). The ML model uses continuous mixed distribution to 
estimate heterogeneity, only that the researcher decides on the types of distribution, whether 
normal, lognormal or triangular distribution (Behnood et al., 2014). Using the ML model, the 
probability that an individual 𝑖 selects a sand storage dam 𝑠 in choice set 𝐽 is expressed as follows 
(Meyerhoff et al., 2014). 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖
𝑛|𝛽𝑖,𝐾𝑖) = ∏
𝑒(𝑉𝑠𝑖𝑛)
∑ 𝑒
(𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑛)𝐽
𝑗=1
.𝑁𝑛=1                                                                                                (3) 
where 𝑦𝑖
𝑛 represent the series of choices over N choice scenarios presented to individual i. It is 
not possible to predict parameter estimates accurately and as such random variation is 
accommodated to ensure preferences vary across individuals in the estimation process. The choice 
probability is thus obtained as an integral of the product of logit probabilities over the distribution 
of 𝛽𝑖 as follows. 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖
𝑛|𝛽𝑖,𝐾𝑖) = ∫ ∏
𝑒(𝑉𝑠𝑖𝑛)
∑ 𝑒(𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑛)𝐽𝑗=1
𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽.
𝑁
𝑛=1
                                                                                (4)      
In this study we assumed normal distributions for all attributes but lognormal distribution for our 
cost attribute. The confidence intervals for the willingness to pay coefficient estimates were 
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generated using the Delta method. We estimate the choice probabilities as expressed in equation 4 
using the maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) at 1200 Halton draws. We estimated a model with 
three alternative specific constants (ASCs) variables for the first, second and the status quo 
alternatives. ASCs were included to improve model fitness and reduce systematic bias resulting 
from respondents’ tendency to choose the first alternative (Hasselbach and Roosen, 2015, and for 
an application, Markova-Nenova and Wätzold, 2018). 
2.2 Benefit losses analysis  
We calculated the willingness to pay (WTP) for each of the dam attributes as the negative ratio of 
the marginal utility coefficient of each attribute and the marginal utility for the cost coefficient 
(Hensher et al., 2015).  
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒 = −
𝛽𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒
𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒
                                                                                           (5) 
The WTP per farmer per season for the baseline level attributes was calculated as the negative (-) 
of the sum of the coefficient estimates (βs) of the non-baseline levels due to hybrid coding (Cooper 
et al., 2012; Hensher et al., 2015). For instance, to estimate the marginal WTP for government 
institutions, we take the sum of the negative of the coefficient estimates of NGOs and farmer 
networks. The differences in the WTP values between different governing organizations represent 
‘part-worth’ values for the WTP estimates, as one moves from governance by NGOs to governance 
by farmer networks and government institutions. We interpret these part-worth values as the 
benefit losses of individual farmers. The regional benefit losses are calculated by multiplying the 
part-worth values with the total number of households in Makueni County. 
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3. Case study area and survey design 
The data was collected among farmers in Makueni County, which is located in the arid and semi-
arid regions of Eastern Kenya. Its area is approximately 8,034.7 km2 with a population of 989,050, 
of which about 61% are poor1 (DoALFS, 2016). The County is divided into four sub-counties: 
Kilome, Mbooni, Makueni and Kibwezi (Figure 1). The sub-counties receive rainfall ranging from 
300 mm to 1200 mm per year (GoK, 2013). Rain-fed agriculture predominates in the study area. 
The area is divided into three livelihood zones defined by the prevalent agricultural production: 1) 
mixed dairy, food crop and coffee farming, 2) mixed food crop and dairy farming, and 3) 
marginalized food crop and livestock farming (DoALFS, 2016; Reliefweb, 2017). All three 
livelihood zones are highly vulnerable to the frequent severe droughts that have occurred in Kenya. 
These droughts have reduced the effectiveness of existing crop and water conservation measures 
leading to either low yields or crop failure and water scarcity (Mutimba et al., 2010). 
The farmers in Makueni County have a homogenous culture and organize themselves into groups 
known as Mwethya (farmer networks). These farmer networks are registered with the government 
as self-help groups. In the networks, farmers share ideas, expertise and labor resources with the 
aim of developing different agricultural and community projects. They work together with NGOs 
and government institutions to improve water supply, food production, income and health, as well 
as advocate for inter-community education, peace and justice (UDO, 2013; ADS, 2015). 
                                                            
1 A poor person is one who has one dollar a day to meet their food and water needs (Loewenberg, 2014). 
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Figure 1: Map of Makueni County created by authors and overlaid on the world topographic map 
(Single fitting image) 
3.1 Selection of attributes and attribute levels 
Prior to the choice experiment, one of the authors conducted focus group discussions with farmers 
and semi-structured interviews with local NGOs, farmer networks and officials of government 
institutions. The purpose of these discussions was to understand the local situation, identify 
appropriate adaptation measures, farmers’ possible contributions and potential governing 
organizations. Table 1 shows the choice of attributes and attribute levels for the adaptation 
measures and governing organizations selected. All the levels represent improvements on the 
current situation (status quo) at the point in time when the focus group discussions and semi-
structured interviews took place. 
 
 
Mbooni 
Kilome 
Makueni 
Kibwezi 
Tsavo 
West 
Kenya 
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Table 1: Attribute and attribute levels  
Attribute Levels 
Different sand dam sizes and volume of 
water in US gallons 
 4 x 90m, 3 million US gallons of water 
 3 x 52m, 2 million US gallons of water 
 2 x 26m, 1 million US gallons of water  
Installation of water pumps for water 
distribution 
 Solar pump 
 Diesel pump 
 Hand pump 
Afforestation on the steep areas of the sand 
dam 
 8km, 4 rows of Grevillea trees 
 4km, 2 rows of Grevillea trees 
 2km, 1 row of Grevillea trees 
Governing organizations  
 NGO 
 Government 
 Farmer networks 
Labor time contribution in weeks  1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 
 
 
The first attribute is related to the farmers’ decision on the height of the dam wall to be constructed 
across the seasonal rivers and the estimated amount of water stored. The standard heights of sand 
storage dam walls are between 1 and 4 meters high (Onder and Yilmaz, 2005). An increasing 
height implies that more water and sand can be stored. The sand accumulated in the dam filters 
water and protects it from evaporation and pollution (Maddrell and Neal, 2012). The volumes of 
water stated were chosen according to Utooni Development Organization report (UDO, 2013).  
The second attribute refers to the installation of surface water pumps for the distribution of the 
water that accumulates behind the dam wall. Different types of pumps are potentially available 
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and they represent different attribute levels. The first level is a solar pump, the second level is a 
diesel pump and the third level, a hand pump involving manual extraction of water to the surface.  
The third attribute is the farmers’ decision on the afforestation of the steep areas of the dam site 
with Grevillea robusta tree species to prevent silting. Grevillea robusta tree species have been 
used by farmers in Makueni County for agroforestry purposes (Muthuri et al., 2005). These tree 
species provide benefits in terms of climatic improvements, erosion control, shade provision, 
separation of farm boundaries and mulch provision (Muthuri et al., 2005). The first attribute level 
is defined by 4 rows of Grevillea robusta trees species along a total of 8 km long terraces, which 
means that the highest volume of water and the least amount of silt accumulate in the dam. The 
second level is defined by 2 rows of Grevillea robusta trees along a total of 4 km long terrace, 
meaning there is moderate accumulation of water and less silt in the dam. The third level is defined 
by 1 row of Grevillea robusta trees along a total of 2 km long terrace implying an accumulation 
of a low amount of water and more silt in the dam.  
To govern the construction of a dam with attributes 1-3, the farmers in Makueni County require 
an organization. Farmers’ preferences for a specific governing organization are captured by the 
governing organization attribute. For this attribute, the first level represents non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), the second, farmer networks and the third, government institutions. 
The fifth attribute is the farmers’ decision on the amount of labor time in weeks they are willing 
to contribute to dam construction. Labor time in weeks is chosen as the payment mode because 
during focus group discussions, farmers stated that they were familiar and comfortable with 
contributing labor time rather than paying cash for the dam construction. Labor time is required 
for providing stones, water and sand for the dam wall construction, for installing water pumps and 
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planting trees along the steep areas of the dam site. Some of the officials interviewed were 
architects, particularly from the Utooni community development organization (UDO), who stated 
that it took 4-8 weeks to complete a dam wall installed with a pump and tree row(s) along the 
slopes. Based on this information, six labor time contribution levels were selected assuming that 
farmers are able to contribute 1-8 weeks, i.e: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8 weeks per dry season. Typically, 
dam construction takes place during the dry season in January, February to mid-March and June, 
July, August, and September to mid-October when most farmers are not too busy with farm work. 
The status quo represents zero (0) weeks meaning no labor time is contributed and thus no dam 
constructed. 
3.2 Design of choice sets and survey administration 
The construction of choice sets from the attributes of the dam follows a D-efficient design. The 
combination of attributes and attribute levels would be impossible if based on full factorial design 
with 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x 6 = 486 hypothetical scenarios. This study uses the fractional factorial design, 
which focuses on the estimation of principal effects among other alternatives in the choice set 
(Hensher, 1994; Louviere et al., 2000; Hoyos, 2010). To generate prior parameter estimates for 
the D-efficient designs, the preference ranks for the attribute levels identified were subjected to 
expert judgment and to the preference ranking method proposed by Bliemer and Collins (2016). 
The priors were used to optimize D-efficient designs for a multinomial logit model using Ngene 
software. The choice scenarios generated were pre-tested among 60 farmers in Makueni County. 
The responses collected from the pre-test process were used to generate prior parameter estimates 
for D-efficient designs for the final survey. The pre-test process also helped improve the 
questionnaire and choice scenarios. The final survey design was composed of a total of 12 choice 
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cards in 3 blocks, with 4 choice cards per block among 300 farmers. An example of a choice card 
is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Example of a choice card presented to farmers (English translation) 
(Single fitting image) 
 
Each choice card had four options including a status quo option. The survey took place face to face 
and was administered by four enumerators who spoke the local dialect under the close supervision 
of one of the authors. A two-stage sampling procedure was employed to select the farmers. First, 
four divisions (Wote, Makueni, Kibwezi and Mtito Andei) were selected. Second, a simple random 
sampling of respondents in villages was done. 
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The choice scenarios were hybrid coded which means that there are two base levels: one effects 
and the other dummy coded. Hybrid coding was used to prevent a perfect confounding effect with 
the overall mean (Hensher et al., 2015, pp.213-214). The status quo option (option IV) is dummy 
coded as zero (0) while the lowest level of each attribute is effects coded -1 (see Table A.1 in the 
appendix). 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Sample characteristics 
Out of a total of 300 questionnaires issued to farmers in Makueni County, 283 were completed. 
However, 23 questionnaires were excluded from further analysis because they were considered 
protest responses. Excluding the protest responses helps to avoid any irregularities and 
underestimation of willingness to pay among respondents (Lo and Jim, 2015). The final sample 
size that was used for data analysis included 260 respondents. Table 2 shows the socioeconomic 
variables of the farmers interviewed. 
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Table 2: Sample statistics  
Covariates Count % Sample 
Gender 
Male 150 58 
Female 110 42 
Age in years 
   18-39 years  138 53 
   ≥40 years 122 47 
Education level 
Formal education 158 61 
No schooling 102 39 
Farm income in $ per season 
   ≥ approx. 400  101 39 
   ≤ approx. 400 159 61 
Mean household size 260 6 
Access to climate adaptation information 
Have access to climate information 103 40 
Have no access to climate information 157 60 
Membership to community-based organizations/groups 
Members to farmer groups 163 63 
Non-members of farmer groups 97 37 
Distance of homestead to the river in km 
Short to medium distance 210 81 
Long distance (approx.   ≥8Km) 50 19 
Type of water source 
Surface water (river, dams, pond etc.) 93 36 
Groundwater (hand-dug well etc.)  167 64 
Mean TLU per household*                                                                                         11
* TLUs stands for tropical livestock unit and can be easily converted to livestock numbers using common units; cattle 
= 0.7, sheep = 0.1, goats = 0.1, pigs = 0.2, chickens = 0.01 (HarvestChoice, 2015) 
Exchange rate (June 30th 2016) 1 USD=101.095 KES (www.xe.com, 2016) 
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4.2 Farmers’ preferences for dam attributes 
Table 3 represents the marginal utility coefficient estimates for the different dam attributes. The 
coefficient estimates were generated using the ML model. The McFadden Pseudo 𝑅2 for the ML 
model was 0.30 indicating an acceptable model fit. The coefficients for the dam attributes are 
statisitically significant with a positive sign except for the wall of 3m high * 90m width with 2 
million US gallons of water stored and 4 km 2 rows of Grevillea robusta trees planted. The cost 
attribute represented by labor time contributions in weeks in our estimations has a negative sign, 
which means that farmers have a negative utility if they contribute more labor time. This is not 
surprising as farmers face opportunity costs in terms of foregone earnings if they contribute time 
for the dam construction. The positive and significant alternative specific constants (ASCs) 
coefficients indicate heterogeinity of preferences where farmer-specific factors are assumed to 
influence the choice of dam options that farmers make. The standard deviations for all attributes 
are large and statistically significant, meaning that distinct clasess may exist within the sample 
analyzed.  
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Table 3: Marginal coefficient estimates for dam attributes  
 
Attributes Coefficients (Std. Errors) Std. Devs (Std. Errors) 
Dam height and water volume 
4 m* 90 m, 3 million US gallons of water 0.654***(0.166) 0.959*** (0.236) 
3 m* 90 m, 2 million US gallons of water 0.161 (0.198) 0.849*** (0.264) 
2 m * 90 m, 1 million US gallons of watera -0.815  -1.808  
Water distribution pumps 
Solar pump 1.213*** (0.166) 1.201*** (0.233) 
Diesel pump 0.440*** (0.146) 0.884*** (0.193) 
Hand pumpa -1.653 -2.085 
Afforestation/tree planting 
8 km, 4 rows of Grevillea trees 0.606*** (0.164) 0.994*** (0.195)       
4 km, 2 rows of Grevillea trees 0.046 (0.169) 0.924*** (0.233) 
2 km, 1 row of Grevillea treesa -0.652 -1.918 
Governance structures 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 0.521*** (0.175)       1.099*** (0.254) 
Farmer networks 0.282** (0.139) 0.915*** (0.229) 
Government institutionsa -0.803 -2.014 
Cost-attribute 
Labor time contributions in weeks -3.666*** (0.306) 3.666*** (0.306) 
Alternative specific constants (ASCs) 
ASC1 4.425*** (0.404) 
ASC2 4.760*** (0.392) 
ASCsq 4.324*** (0.407) 
Number of observations 1040 
McFadden Pseudo R − squared 0.300 
Alkaike Information Criterion (AIC) 1.978 
Log-likelihood -1007.623 
Restricted log likelihood -1440.360 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
*Std. Errors - Standard errors, Std. Devs - Standard Deviations, ASCsq - Alternative Specific Constant status quo 
aThe estimates for the base levels are calculated as the negative sum of the other levels due to the effects/hybrid coding 
used (Cooper et al., 2012). 
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4.3 Farmers’ WTP for sand storage dam attributes  
Based on the marginal utility coefficients (Table 3), we estimated farmers’ marginal willingness 
to pay for each dam attribute in terms of labor time contributions per season (Table 4). The standard 
errors were estimated at 95% confidence interval using the Wald procedure (Delta method). Table 
4 reports the marginal willingnesss to pay estimates. The base scenario in our case is represented 
by the lowest level of each of the dam attributes. The differences in the WTP between level 
attributes is interpreted as the change of the incremental value resulting from the difference 
between levels (Table 5). The differences represent the ‘part-worth’ values in the WTP estimates 
and are calculated as differences between different attribute levels. For example, using government 
institutions as the baseline, farmers were willing to pay labor time equivalent to 0.361 (0.142 – (-
0.219)) weeks per farmer per season when the governing organization supporting the dam 
construction was an NGO and not a government institution. Equally, farmers’ WTP was 0.296 
(0.077 – (-0.219)) weeks per farmer per season if the governing organization to organize and 
support the dam construction is a farmer network and not a government institution. 
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Table 4: Marginal willingness to pay for dam attributes 
Attributes 
MWTP in 
weeks/farmer 
Std. Error 
95 % Confidence 
Interval 
Sand dam height and water volume 
4m * 90m, 3 million US gallons of water 0.178*** 0.047 0.086  0.270 
3m * 90m, 2million US gallons of water 0.044 0.054 -0.062  0.150 
2m * 26m, 1 million US gallons of waterb -0.222     
Water distribution pumps 
Solar pump 0.331*** 0.049 0.236  0.426 
Diesel pump 0.120*** 0.039 0.043  0.197 
Hand pumpb -0.451    
Afforestation/tree planting 
8km, 4 rows of Grevillea robusta trees  0.165*** 0.044 0.079  0.252 
4km, 2 rows of Grevillea robusta trees 0.012 0.046 -0.078  0.103 
2km, 1 row of Grevillea robusta treesb -0.178    
Governance structures 
NGOs 0.142*** 0.045 0.054  0.230 
Farmer networks 0.077**       0.039 0.001  0.153 
Government institutionsb -0.219     
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
Std. Error – Standard Error, MWTP –Marginal willingness to pay 
bThe WTP values for the base levels equals the negative sum of the WTP for the other levels due to the effects/hybrid 
coding used (Cooper et al., 2012). 
 
 
4.3 Benefit losses due to inappropriate governing organizations 
Table 5 reports the individual and total benefit losses in labor time and dollars that occur if dam 
construction is organized by farmer networks or government institutions and not by NGOs. We 
convert the benefit losses from labor time in weeks to dollars by multiplying with the average 
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market wage rate that a worker receives after working for a week on a dam construction site. The 
average wage rate was obtained in Kenya shillings from farmer responses during the survey period 
and converted into dollars based on the market exchange rate (30th June, 2016) during the survey 
period in our estimation. In order to estimate the benefit losses at the regional level, we assume 
that dam construction projects are carried out throughout Makueni County and every household 
contributes labor time to these projects. The estimated benefit losses in Makueni County are $ 
482,766 per season if farmer networks and a lot more, $ 2,679,706, if government institutions 
govern the dam construction instead of NGOs.  
 
Table 5: Individual household and regional benefit losses 
Attributes 
Marginal 
willingness 
to pay 
Individual benefit losses (for a 
corresponding change in 
governing organization) 
Regional benefit 
losses 
Governance structures                       in weeks per farmer per season 
1. NGOs   0.142 -0.361 (from 1. to 3.) -67,322 
2. Farmer networks 0.077 -0.065 (from 1. to 2.) -12,129 
3. Government institutions -0.219 -0.296 (from 2. to 3.) -55,194 
Governance structures in dollars ($) per farmer per season 
1. NGOs 5.65       -14.37 (from 1. to 3.) -2,679,706 
2. Farmer networks 3.06       -2.59 (from 1. to 2.) - 482,766 
3. Government institutions -8.71       -11.78 (from 2. to 3.) -2,196,940 
Total number of households in Makueni County  186,478  
 
Average market wage rate paid for sand dam construction per week $39.80 
  
Exchange rate (June 30th 2016) 1 USD = 101.095 KES   (www.xe.com, 2016) 
*The negative sign (-) indicates a benefit loss 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to assess farmers’ preferences for good governance in 
implementing climate change adaptation measures in developing countries using the example of 
sand storage dam construction in Makueni County, Kenya. Applying a choice experiment, we 
surveyed 300 farmers and found that farmers prefer dam constructions to be governed by NGOs, 
closely followed by farmer networks. In contrast, farmers dislike government institutions 
governing dam construction. We take the willingness to contribute less labor time for the dam 
construction as an indicator of benefit losses that occur due to bad governance. Converting this 
labor time into monetary values and summing up individual values in the County as a whole, we 
are able to identify benefit losses due to bad governance in implementing climate change 
adaptation measures for the whole of Makueni County. We find that losses are $ 482,766 if farmer 
networks govern dam construction instead of NGOs, and $2,679,706 if government institutions 
implement the project instead of an NGO. Our findings are relevant in two respects. 
(1) To our knowledge, this is the first study to quantify benefit losses due to poor governance in 
the area of climate change adaptation in developing countries. For a poor country such as Kenya, 
the identified amounts are substantial and suggest that careful selection of governing organization 
for climate change adaptation projects is highly relevant. This finding supports other more 
qualitative studies that identified poor governance as a main barrier to successful climate change 
adaptation in developing countries (Binswanger-Mkhize and McCalla, 2010; Robinson, 2017; 
Pueyo, 2018). The high willingness to contribute labor time if NGOs are the governing 
organization may be explained by comparatively low levels of corruption of NGOs and higher 
levels of trustworthiness. NGOs also have a reputation for addressing farmers’ issues more directly 
(Islam and Nursey-Bray, 2017; Brass, 2012). Willingness to contribute labor time is still high if 
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farmer networks are the governing organization, which may be explained by a certain level of trust. 
This is in line with previous findings indicating the importance of farmer networks for local 
communities, for example in facilitating the access of inputs such as seeds, providing information, 
financial resources, and technologies and organizing social projects (Orsi et al., 2017). In contrast, 
government institutions in Kenya tend to be marred by high levels of bureaucracy and corruption 
(Transparency International, 2017).  
(2) Our study also contributes to the methodological discussion of the application of choice 
experiments in developing countries, namely the selection of the payment vehicle, i.e. the 
description in the choice experiment of how the project in question would be financed if it were 
implemented (Ivehammar, 2009). The selection of the payment vehicle and its impact on 
respondents’ willingness to pay has received some attention in a developed country context 
(Bergstrom et al., 2004; Campos et al., 2007; Ivehammar, 2009) but not in a developing country 
context. Our study is relevant in this respect as the different governing organizations in our CE 
can also be interpreted as different potential payment vehicles that may be used in CE studies in 
developing countries. Our results suggest that the willingness to pay of respondents for 
environmental projects in developing countries substantially differs depending on whether the 
project is financed and organized through a governmental tax, a contribution to an NGO 
administered fund, or a contribution to a farmer network. The reason is obviously a different level 
of trust that the money will be appropriately used for the designated purpose. This result calls for 
a careful and clearly justified selection of a payment vehicle in CE studies in developing countries.   
Two straightforward policy recommendations can de drawn from our results. First, the selection 
of appropriate governing organizations is essential for the successful implementation of climate 
change adaptation measures. In particular, channeling international support for climate adaptation 
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measures such as from the Green Climate Fund through the government seems inadequate as it 
bears a high risk of efficiency losses resulting in highly needed climate adaptation measures being 
badly designed and implemented. Second, our research supports those who call for governmental 
reforms to improve governance structures and safeguard against corruption in the administration 
(e.g. World Bank, 2018). A badly functioning government is not only a barrier to climate change 
adaptation but in general to sustainable development that successfully addresses poverty and 
environmental degradation.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Sand storage dam attributes and attribute levels coding scheme 
Variable Description Coding scheme 
Attributes 
4 m high x 90m wide, with 3 
million US gallons of water 
The highest sand storage dam 
wall (DM1) 
1, if yes, -1, if the wall height is 
2m high x 90 wide, with 1 million 
US gallons of water, 0, otherwise 
3m high x 90m wide, with 2 
million US gallons of water 
The moderate sand storage dam 
wall height (DM2) 
1, if yes, -1, if the wall height is 
2m high x 90 wide, with 1 million 
US gallons of water, 0, otherwise 
 
Solar pump Uses solar power to pump water 
(PMP1) 
1, if yes, -1, if hand pump is 
installed, 0, otherwise 
Diesel pump Uses diesel to pump water 
(PMP2) 
1, if yes, -1, if hand pump is 
installed, 0, otherwise 
 
8km, 4 rows of Grevillea 
trees 
4 rows of Grevillea trees to be 
planted along terraces (AFST1) 
1, if yes, -1, if 1 row of Grevillea 
trees is planted, 0, otherwise 
4km, 2 rows of Grevillea 
trees 
2 rows of Grevillea trees to be 
planted along terraces (AFST2) 
1, if yes, -1, if 1 row of Grevillea 
trees is planted, 0, otherwise 
 
Non-governmental 
organization (NGOs) 
Non-profit making organization 1, if yes, -1, if governance 
structure is government 
institutions, 0, otherwise 
Farmer networks/groups Organized groups composed of 
farmers 
1, if yes, -1, if governance 
structure is government 
institutions, 0, otherwise 
 
Labor time in weeks  Price per season in weeks 
(LAB) 
0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 ,8 
 
